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tative believer probably will be more willing to abandon her position for the
sake of some worthwhile and important earthly good for herself and to think
it appropriate to do so if this sort of situation were to arise" (164 f.). In fact, an
implication of McKim's "position is that most martyrs [including those in
one's own tradition] who have died for their faith have been misled" (204).
Most traditional theists, I should think, would regard this as a reductio ad
absurdum of the claim that tentative religious belief can be an adequate substi-
tute for the faith valorized in their traditions. Traditional Christians will be
particularly unhappy since it implies that not only Peter and Paul and other
early martyrs but Jesus himself were seriously in error.
4. Can't one tentatively embrace a position which includes the belief
that one should hold all of its central beliefs non-tentatively? Suppose that
Sarah believes tl1at Rl, R2,...Rn are good reasons for embracing traditional
Christianity and therefore does so but, having adopted the Critical Stance,
does so tentatively. So one of the things Sarah now tentatively believes is
that her embrace of Christianity should not be tentative. And since (as
McKim points out) tentative belief is belief, she therefore takes steps to
ensure that her belief in Christianity will become wholehearted. I do not
think that Sarah's behavior is either incoherent or irrational. But notice
that if it is incoherent or irrational, then one can't coherently or rationally
tentatively adopt traditional Christianity even though one may have what
appears to one to be good reasons Jor doing so. (McKim notes an objection lying
in this neighborhood in a footnote but "wonders why Christians could not
shed this particular belief [that Christian "belief must involve decisive
assent"] and yet keep all or most of their other beliefs intact" [267]. The
suggestion presumably is that one could tentatively embrace most of the
Christian package without even tentatively embracing the belief that
Christian belief should be non-tentative. This is doubtful, however, since
the valorization of wholehearted belief appears inextricably bound up with
Christian beliefs about sin, grace, and salvation. It is difficult to imagine
what Paul's letters would look like, for example, if divested of the belief
that assent to the great things of the gospel should be wholehearted.)
In spite of these problems, however, I recommend this book. Anyone
interested in issues raised by divine hiddenness or religious diversity, or in
the nature of a reasonable religious faith, should examine it carefully.
McKim's arguments are detailed, balanced, and to the point. Future writ-
ers on these topics must take them into account.
God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. GanssIe; contributors: William Lane
Craig, Paul Helm, Alan Padgett, and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Downer's Grove,
11: InterVarsity Press, 2001). ISBN:0-8308-1551-1. Pp.247, $18.00 paper.
JEREMY PIERCE, Syracuse University
This book packages somewhat popularly a scholarly debate previously
available almost entirely in philosophy journals and hardcover mono-
graphs. Greg Ganssie's introduction covers the main issues in the fairly
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technical recent literature, a couple issues even in more detail than the
contributors.
The goal is to bring technical philosophical dis\ussion to the average
non-philosopher. Much of the book does this fairly well, though the so-
called informed layperson will find some difficult parts. A few places are
more technical than rigor requires. Symbolic notation or insufficiently
explained technical jargon can hide reasoning rather than make it clear,
and the untrained might skip these sections, thus missing profound rea-
soning or accepting a conclusion on authority. This undermines the book's
purpose, since the fruits of philosophical research should be what we can
say and why we think we can say it, not just who said what.
The contributors are Paul Helm, Alan Padgett, William Lane Craig, and
Nicholas Wolterstorff. Helm defends the view that God does not experi-
ence time in any way, while Wolterstorff holds that God experiences time
in an unqualified way, and Padgett and Craig try to offer intermediate
views (i.e. with qualifications to the thesis that God is in time). Both
Padgett and Craig want to say that God is in time in some sense with
respect to creation but not in time in some other sense not relative to cre-
ation. I will discuss their specific variations on this below.
Two imbalances in the book are so overpowering that they occupy most
of what I say. The first involves what most of the contributors call the
dynamic vs. static theories of time (or the A-theory and the B-theory, as
philosophers more commonly call them). They say these terms are less
loaded, but 'static' suggests no change, which most B-theorists (static view)
will be surprised to hear about their view. The real issue is whether past,
present, and future are objective. According to the dynamic view, there are
objective facts about past, present, and future, facts not just derived from
facts about before, after, or simultaneity. According to the dynamic view,
knowing all the facts about before, after, or simultaneity would not give
information about past, present, and future. One could know what hap-
pens before and after each other without knowing when now is along that
line. The static view takes this to be a psychological fact about our percep-
tion of time, and facts about past, present, and future hold because of facts
about before, after, and simultaneity. The dynamic view insists that a dis-
tinction in reality grounds this perception.
Helm alone of the contributors represents the static view, despite its
place as the standard view among metaphysicians today, and he gives no
argument for it. The other contributors give little argument for the dynam-
ic view aside from appeals to intuition and supposeclly obvious apriori
truths that no static theorist would grant. Static theorists have two main
arguments against the dynamic view that do not get their due in the
book-the argument from physics and the truthmaker objection.
Within the dynamic view, presentists hold th.at the present is the only
time that exists (in some way beyond just saying it is the only time that now
exists). The alternatives are the growing block theory, according to which the
present and the past exist, which means reality is growing, and the moving
spotlight view, according to which all times exist but the present is like a
spotlight moving across the whole block of limes. The majority of dynamic
theories reject these two alternative accounts in favor of presentism.
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The growing block view is easy to distinguish from presentism and the
static view. It differs on what exists. The future does not, but the past and
present do. Some consider it to be an advantage of the view (for free will)
that the future is not apart of what exists (since on presentism, oddly, the
past seems open also if openness means not existing). However, many
philosophers are uncomfortable with the resulting truth-value gaps, saying
truth about the future does not require causal predetermination. Either
way, the dynamic theorist intends to show what is privileged about the
present. According to presentism, the present is what is special by existing.
If the past exists also, the difference between the past and the present is no
longer ontological. The present is just the edge of reality, no more real th.an
the past. The growing block view gives no opportunity to rejoice that the
past is not real, since it is just as real as the present. (The moving spotlight
view, which holds that past, present, and future all exist, but something is
special about the present, succumbs to both objections.)
Whatever the value of the reasons, presentism is the standard dynamic
account of time, one that seems to be held by Padgett, Craig, and
Wolterstorff (though pp.196-197 suggest Wolterstorff may hold a growing
block view). The truthmaker problem is the biggest difficulty presentists
spend their time dealing with. If every truth has a truthmaker, and there
are truths even about past events, then something in the present needs to
ground that truth. Contemporary presentists spend much time seeking to
overcome this objection, and the main solutions proposed to date are not
fully satisfying even to many presentists.
The other argument static theorists give is the argument from physics.
The majority consensus is that a dynamic theory is inconsistent with rela-
tivity theory. Presentism entails that things simultaneous with what I'm
now doing have a privileged ontological status. The problem is that what
is simultaneous with what I'm now doing is relative to one's frame of ref-
erence. The point of dynamic theories is that what is present (and past and
future) is wholly objective. As a result, almost all metaphysicians and
philosophers of physics hold the static theory.
Craig goes so far in the opposite direction as to suggest that relativity
theory shows presentism to be true. Craig's views on this issue are not rep-
resentative of the overwhelming consensus among philosophers, and no
one in the book mentions this. Here the goal of bringing current academic
work to the non-academic is short-circuited. A minority view is presented
without suitable interaction with. the majority view. Helm's responses are
limited for such a central issue, and most static theorists are unmoved by
the arguments given by the three dynamic theorists. A strong consensus
among philosophers is severely misrepresented.
My second main criticism has to do with balance of views. Wolterstorff,
Craig, and Padgett all have views involving a temporal element in God,
and Helm is the sole defender of a truly timeless God, but Padgett and
Craig try to describe themselves as holding intermediate views for the sake
of balance. This balance is not so clear. Padgett's view is not much different
from Wolterstorff's standard temporalist view but with two temporal
series instead of one, and because Craig's view is harder to place I will save
that discussion for last. So the book is incomplete on the atemporal side
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and top-heavy on the temporalist side, though it does at first appear bal-
anced from the contributors' own initial descriptions of their views.
What is most obviously missing is Brian Leftow's way of handling a
wholly atemporal God. One key problem for those who hold God to be
timeless is how God's actions can affect creation. God performs one big act
that has its consequences throughout all time, but nothing in God is at any
of those times. On a static view of time, this works out fine, as Helm argues,
but some atemporal theorists hold a dynamic theory. All the contributors of
this volume criticize the famous Stump/Kretzmann approach of having E-
simultaneity and T-simultaneity (for being simultaneous in eternity and
simultaneous in time), then saying that God is ET-simultaneous with things
in creation. This relation is not really defined and seems to hold between
God and anything in creation by default, which explains little.
Leftow tries another approach. God is just plain simultaneous with
everything in creation. However, this is not so because of any relation in
time. He is simultaneous with them in eternity, since they are also in eterni-
ty. So God and all temporal things are together in eternity, while temporal
things are also in time. They have no temporal relations in eternity, but they
have analogous relations. It is as if the whole block of time the static theo-
rists believe in is there in eternity. In time there is only the present. The rela-
tion between God and temporal things is then explained, and this solves
other problems also. There are a number of issues still to deal with, but
Leftow's view has its place in the range of views just as much as any view
in this volume, and the book suffers without his responses to the objections
raised against him (which take up at least as much room as the objections
against Helm). In his closing comments, Craig says, uOn this issue, signifi-
cantly, all four contributors to this volume are one." I am not sure how sig-
nificant that is, since Leftow's view was not given tull place in this book.
As for the remaining actual contributors to the volume, Wolterstorff
holds the standard temporal view. God is in time. God's fundamental
properties include having thoughts in temporal succession. Craig and
Padgett want to say something like this, but they qualify it.
In Padgett's responses to criticism he moves very close to Wolterstorff's
view. He discusses two parallel series of time, one for creation and a sepa-
rate one for God. Our time series has a metric with temporal distances,
while God's does not. But God also has real relations to temporal things, so
his time series gets infected with the metric once creation occurs, though
beforehand it has no metric. So relative to his own being before creation,
God's time is without metric, and relative to creation after creation occurs,
God's actions and thoughts are subject to a kind of metric. Padgett con-
cludes that God is timeless relative to his own being but temporal with
respect to creation. This is a little odd, but he aSSLImes duration without
change is not time. In no other sense does Padgett admit atemporality for
God. God existed before creation. That period is not considered temporal,
but it is considered earlier than creation. Therefore the atemporalist will
consider it temporal. That leaves Wolterstorff and Padgett disagreeing
mostly about the use of the word 'time'. Wolterstorff says he takes no view
on this issue and has little to say about Padgett. This is no in-between posi-
tion but a more specific version of temporalism.
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Craig is more complicated. He wants to be an atemporalist in some sense
as weH as a temporalist, which rnight suggest putting him in the in-between
category, but his view is not immediately clear. He denies the foHowing
incoherent claim: "God existed atemporally before time and then afterward
entered time." If God had been doing anything before anything else, then
God must have been in time at the earlier point. So he says God is atemporal
"without" creation and temporal "since" creation. I'm not sure what "since"
means. If it's temporal, then the timeless state is before creation, but he offi-
cially denies that. One rnight look at his actual language and claim that he
contradicts himself, but Craig insists there is another way to read this.
The most obvious way to make sense of it is in a way analogous to
Leftow's view. Tensed truths, which God cannot know without having
temporal relations, are a problem for the atemporalist dynamic theorist.
Leftow's solution is to have everything in eternity, so God and all other
things are genuinely related without infecting God with temporality.
Craig's solution might be the reverse. Instead of bringing temporal things
into eternity while also in time, Craig brings God into time while also hav-
ing hirn in eternity. Thjs is like Padgett's two series of time, except one is
eternity with no duration, and that eternal point is not temporally related
to any of the points in the time series. Leftow has temporal things in both
and purely atemporal things just in eternity, while Craig has God in both
and purely temporal things just in time. God at this eternal time point can
think atemporal thoughts and tenseless truths (e.g. before, after, simul-
taneity). These would be truths acceptable to the static theorist. There
would be no irreducibly tensed truths known by God in th.e atemporal
mode. Then in time God can know tensed truths. This rescues omni-
science, since God does know all truths.
If this is Craig's view, it coherently rescues his starting intuition from its
seeming incoherence. Still, he is forced to say strange things. God qua being
in time knows all the tensed truths, and God qua being in eternity knows
merely tenseless truths (with no terms involving past, present, or future).
There are things true of God in eternity that are false of him in time, and
vice versa. It is misguided to ask simply whether God knows what I am
doing. Craig seems to adopt this stance, but is this his considered view?
Craig's actual words contradict this view on p.186. He describes God's
knowledge "without" creation, pointing out that God in eternity does not
know any tensed propositions and hence no future-tense propositions.
They are not true, so he does not know them. Then he goes on to discuss
God in relation to creation. The hardest claim to reconcile with my
attempted reconstruction of Craig's view is his claim that "at the moment
of creation myriad future-tense propositions suddenly switch truth values,
and God believes only those that are true." The view I have been sketching
takes eternity as its own separate time series with no duration, hence a
point, but Craig's claim about changing truth values suggests that eternity
is befare our time series, which requires it to be just a point on the same
timeline. Perhaps Craig is being careless here, but his final summation in
his response to his critics is the last place I would expect that. Usually less
careful statements are earlier ones that get modified later as responses to
objections clarify the view. Also, he continues to use "since creation"
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instead of sticking with "without creation" when the former clearly
involves a temporal sequence between eternity and time. I take all this as
evidence that my reconstruction may not be Craig's view and that what he
has in mind is closer to the what he admits is incoherent, that God existed
timelessly before time but then entered time and became temporal. If so,
does he just want to have it both ways?
Real Ethics: Rethinking the Foundations of Morality, by Jol1n M. Rist.
Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. viii, 295. $65.00 (cloth); $23.00
(paper).
PAUL COPAN, Palm Beach Atlantic University
John M. Rist, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Classics at the
University of Toronto, has written a superb book on ethics-a "developed
and Christianized system of Platonic realism" (139). It is insightful and
wise, honest and penetrating, thought-provoking and practical. Rist dis-
plays all the marks of a seasoned philosopher, and the reader will not be
disappointed (unless, perhaps, he is a naturalist). Indeed, the book is pro-
foundly critical of all attempts at naturalistic ethics.
Rist sets forth a synopsis of ethical views spanning the history of philos-
ophy with lucid analysis, making for an excellent textbook in ethics-espe-
cially in a day when the transcendent basis for ethics tends to be ignored or
downplayed.
Rist pulls no punches. From beginning to end, he excoriates attempts at
naturalistic moral realism-with all its talk of "rights" and "freedom"-as
the "ethical hangover from a more homogeneous Christian past" (2).
Arglling for a personalized or modified Platonism (along the lines of
Augustine), he leaves us with the only two available alternatives morally
and politically-"Platonism or deception" (283). If Plato and his philo-
sophical successors were radically mistaken, then the world is far stranger
(i.e., unintelligible) and more dreadful than we could conceive.
In his introduction, he speaks to the contemporary "crisis" in the West
about the foundations of ethics, in which it is "widely believed" that tran-
scendental realism is dead or dying and that we must resort to human
choice to "construct" values. The present chaos in ethics is largely due to
the influence of Nietzsche, and ethics is fast moving in the direction of per-
spectivism, constructivism, and relativism. For Plato, the key question
was, "How should I live?" Philosophical truth is a way of life and is not
reducible to any set of propositions (7), and Rist proposes that we look to
Plato and his ilk to build on the important philosophical foundation they
have laid to guide our discussion in the present.
In chapter 1 ("Moral Nihilism: Socrates vs. Thrasymachus"), Rist begins
with Plato's Republic and the Thrasymachean discussion of justice as "the
advantage of the stronger." By this view, no objective values exist, and we
construct which values we want. If there are no objective moral truths,
then Thrasymachus is right. Plato presents us with only two choices-
